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The Possibility and Feasibility of a
100% Reserve Gold Standard
By David Rasho
I.  INTRODUCTION
Throughout modern history and especially in thelast century, business cycles, inflation, andbanking crises have plagued the world
economy.  Such problems stand in the way of achiev-
ing uninterrupted economic growth; the ideal economic
state.  Economists versed in Austrian Business Cycle
Theory claim to have the solution to these problems.
They blame fiat money and fractional reserve bank-
ing for the boom-bust cycle, inflation, and financial
crises.  As a solution, they offer a monetary system
consisting of a 100% reserve gold standard.  Aus-
trian economists have various solutions such as free
banking, but this paper focuses on the 100% reserve
gold standard.
These gold proponents make a strong case
that the introduction of fiat money, government con-
trol of monetary printing, and fractional reserve bank-
ing have all hurt economic welfare.  Theoretically, they
show how a 100% reserve gold standard could pro-
vide the backbone for an economy.
While the theory is sound and convincing,
these economists seldom address whether a shift to a
100% reserve gold standard is feasible for today's
complex economy.  Use of fiat money is worldwide,
as is fractional reserve banking.  Economies every-
where structure themselves around this system, and
changing the system could be extremely difficult and
costly.  The purpose of this paper is to explore the
workings of a 100% reserve gold standard, to ex-
plain the nature and extremity of the economic and
political obstacles of converting to a 100% gold stan-
dard, and to discuss potential transition processes.
To accomplish this purpose, a history of the United
States' use of gold as money is presented, followed
by an explanation of Austrian Business Cycle theory,
then an explanation of the merits of a 100% reserve
gold standard.  Provided next is a section covering
the implications of a 100% reserve gold standard on
government, followed finally by a survey of proposed
processes for transitioning to such a system.  After
understanding these areas, I conclude the following:
A 100% reserve gold standard, if implemented, would
be far superior to the world's current monetary sys-
tem.  However, Austrian economists have failed to
sufficiently outline a possible plan of transition.  This
deficiency makes the political and economic obstacles
to a 100% reserve gold standard insurmountable.
II.  HISTORY OF THE GOLD STANDARD IN
THE UNITED STATES
A 100% reserve gold standard never existed
in the United States.  But from July 4th, 1776, when
the United States of America declared independence
until the collapse of Bretton Woods on August 15th,
1971, the United States dollar was convertible to gold.
During this time period, the degree of convertibility
varied and was subject to suspension.
Originally, an international gold standard ex-
isted.  Proponents of a 100% reserve gold standard
generally find the classical system far more appealing
than the current fiat system.  Because a 100% re-
serve gold standard never existed, its proponents can-
not empirically prove that the system would work.
Instead they point to the United States in the 1880's,
the decade in which the country maintained its purest
form of the gold standard, as proof that a 100% re-
serve gold standard can allow an economy to experi-
ence uninterrupted economic growth.
Under the international gold standard, gov-
ernment money was redeemable for gold coins.  Gov-
ernments settled trade deficits/surpluses by moving
gold from country to country.  If a government issued
more notes without increased gold backing, prices
and incomes would rise in the country.  Assuming fixed
exchange rates, such monetary expansion must lead
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to a trade deficit as increased domestic prices make
imports less expensive and exports more expensive.
This deficit would lead to an outflow of gold, leaving
the inflating country in a crisis.  The outflow of gold
would place tremendous pressure on the banking
system, which must use a dwindling supply of gold to
back an increasing amount of paper notes.  A coun-
try could not save its currency and continue expand-
ing the money supply without eventually losing all of
their gold.  Inevitably, facing the ruin of their cur-
rency, governments would have to contract the money
supply suddenly.  While the classical gold standard
did not completely prevent business cycles and infla-
tion, it did keep cycles shorter and far less damaging
than those experienced in the 20th century (Rothbard,
1991).
The United States converted the dollar to
gold for most of its history.  In arguing against a gold
standard, one might look to the panics and economic
downturns from 1776-1971 as evidence of the in-
ability of a gold standard to provide the monetary
foundation for an economy.  100% reserve gold stan-
dard proponents hold an alternate view.  Rather than
showing inherent problems with gold as money, they
view this economic turmoil as showing that gold func-
tions as money as well as governments allow it to do
so.
When governments stopped exchanging dol-
lars for gold and printed more money to finance op-
erations such as wars, damaging cycles and inflations
occurred.  For example, in February of 1861, the
U.S. began printing legal tender known as "Green-
backs" to finance the Civil War.  The government
allowed banks to stop making gold payments three
months prior, and over the course of the war prices
increased 110.9%.  Even worse for the economy was
the accompaniment of massive increases in taxes and
public debt (Paul, 1982).  Similar economic hard-
ships occurred as result of massive seignorage dur-
ing the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, and
had similar disastrous impacts on the United States'
economy.
When the United States government experi-
mented with central banking in the 1800's, the
economy suffered.  The Second Bank of the United
States provides a good example.  Set up in January
of 1817, and 20% owned by the government, the
bank immediately began expanding the money supply
through fractional reserves.  In two years, the Second
Bank of the United States had increased the money
supply by 40.7%.  This expansion was followed by a
painful contraction as officials realized the bank would
soon be unable to make gold payments.  In one year,
the money supply dropped 28.3%, resulting in wide-
spread bankruptcies, and even a partial and tempo-
rary return to barter trading (Paul, 1982).  Other vari-
ous forms of fractional reserve banking had similar
effects on the U.S. economy.
The essential point here is that these economic
problems resulted from movement away from a pure
gold standard, not from inherent problems with gold
as money.  From 1879 to 1889, the United States
maintained its most pure version of a gold standard in
history.  The results of this period support the propo-
nents of the 100% reserve gold standard.  The CPI
fell 4.2% while wages jumped a staggering 23%.  In-
terest rates fell substantially, labor productivity rose
26.5%, and GNP per capita increased 3.8% per an-
num.  These statistics can be attributed to a lack of
any sustained inflation, an increase in savings and capi-
tal formation, and technological advancement.  (Paul,
1982). Proponents of a 100% reserve gold standard
maintain that all evidence from the United States' ex-
perience with the gold standard shows that break-
downs under the gold standard come from impurity of
the standard.  They conclude that the degree of purity
is directly correlated with the health of the economy.
The 20th century can be characterized as a
steady movement away from gold as money, culmi-
nating with the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971.
Currently no country offers to convert its currency to
gold.  An international fiat system exists, lacking the
check on inflation that existed under the international
gold standard.  Fractional reserves exist worldwide,
and are regulated by central banks.  At this point it
becomes necessary to discuss the negative effects of
fractional reserve banking.  Making the most compel-
ling argument against fractional reserve banking, and
for a pure gold standard, are the Austrian economists.
III.  AUSTRIAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY
Most proponents of a 100% reserve gold stan-
dard recognize the same major problem with fiat
money.  Governments have the ability to inflate the
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currency through seignorage or fractional reserve
banking.  Rare in history is a government who, given
the power to purchase its own debt, refuses to do so
(Paul, 1982).  Many mainstream economists see no
problem with the current system, but most gold stan-
dard supporters subscribe to a different school of
economic thought.
Austrian economists view inflation in a radi-
cally different manner than the mainstream.  Accord-
ing to the Austrians, inflation is defined as an increase
in the supply of money.  The increase in prices that
follows is merely a consequence of inflation rather
than inflation itself.  Monetarists partially accept the
Austrian definition because they agree that the money
supply is closely correlated with inflation.  On the other
hand, economists with more Keynesian leanings fail
to accept the Austrian definition.  Ludwig von Mises
founded most Austrian theory regarding inflation dur-
ing the early and mid 20th century.  F.A. Hayek ex-
panded Mises' work on the business cycle after study-
ing under Mises for years (Rockwell, 2000).  Cur-
rent Austrians have extended the theory to a variety
of other areas, but the trademark of the Austrian school
is still business cycle research.
If inflation is any increase in the money sup-
ply, then the causes of inflation are increased money
printing by governments, and the extension of bank
credit through fractional reserve banking.  The source
of the inflation leads to different implications for the
economy, but the same end results.  Austrians con-
tend that of all expansionary policies, those that in-
crease the supply of money without an equal increase
in gold or other commodity money will prove ex-
tremely harmful to economic growth.  Causing this
conclusion to differ from the mainstream's is the
Austrian's intense focus on acting individuals in a con-
stantly changing environment rather than the use of
aggregated equilibrium models.  By focusing in this
manner, Austrians can better understand the distribu-
tion effects of inflation and why expansionary policy
does not promote real economic growth.
One way for inflation to begin occurs when
governments finance deficits by printing more money.
The obvious effect of such policy will be a decrease
in purchasing power as governments create new legal
tender without increased economic growth.  While
mainstream economists move from recognizing the
existence of new money to recognizing an upward
movement in the general price level, Austrians take a
different approach.  They form their theory by fol-
lowing the injection of money, tracing its  consequences
as it moves through the economy.  They account for
what some consider economic phenomena through
an explanation of human action in an inflationary envi-
ronment.
The inflationary cycle begins at the precise
point where a government injects new money into the
economy.  Assuming the new money is for deficit fi-
nancing, it will often first find its way into the hands of
government contractors.  Borrowing from Henry
Hazlitt, the great popularizer of Austrian economics,
the following example will show a case where the
government prints money to pay back war contrac-
tors (Hazlitt, 1996).  As this occurs, these contrac-
tors now have more money than before, while prices
in the rest of the market remain unchanged.  Their
natural tendency will be to respond to their increased
demand by raising prices, expanding production and
investment, and increasing employee wages.  Caus-
ing this is the contractors' perception of themselves
as being better off relative to the rest of the economy.
Such behavior is rational and would be correct under
natural circumstances, but this situation is not natural.
The contractors' higher relative standing exists only
because the new money has yet to raise prices
throughout the economy.
The next phase involves the new investment
and production by the war contractors.  These con-
tractors will spend the newly created money on raw
materials for production such as steel, and on build-
ing materials for a new plant to accommodate the
perceived increase in demand.  At the same time,
employees of the war contractors will begin spending
their additional income on new cars, homes, and luxury
goods.  Now prices and wages rise in the automo-
bile, housing, luxury, steel, and construction indus-
tries.  These participants are better off because their
incomes have increased while the rise in prices has
spread only to their industries and to the war con-
tractor industry.
By this time, the trend should be apparent.
The new money will be further disseminated through-
out the economy and prices will rise in most areas.
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“While Austrians agree that low
interest rates are a recipe for a
short economic expansion,
again they predict horrible
long-term implications.”
The greatest gainers from the situation are the war
contractors who used their increased income in a
market that had not adjusted its prices.  Individuals
who received the new money
last but were forced to pay the
already adjusted prices are
the greatest losers.  This group
most often includes individu-
als on fixed-incomes and the
lower income population.  At
this point it is important to re-
alize that in the end all parties
will lose.  A recession will re-
sult because businesses re-
ceived improper market signals and based their ac-
tions on them.  Those who received the new money
early expanded their production based on a false sig-
nal telling them they were in a better position relative
to the rest of the economy.  The truth of the matter is
that the boom for certain industries was counterfeit.
The war contractors received their increased money
from a customer who would have defaulted without
the printing press.  Their expanded production and
investment, as well as expansions in other areas, must
now be wiped out as it becomes apparent that the
economic growth was artificial.
While the above example conveys the intui-
tive nature of the Austrian theory, its simplification of
the process makes further discussion necessary.  In
most economies, expansionary policies are undertaken
more than once.  This makes the situation more com-
plex as individuals begin to expect inflation and act
accordingly.  When people begin to expect inflation,
sometimes prices actually rise faster than new money
is being created.  The effect of this is to create a short-
age of money in the economy.  While policy makers
may argue that this phenomenon is a sign that still more
money should be put in circulation, Austrians strongly
disagree (Mises, 1978).  They maintain that increas-
ing the money supply further will only worsen the prob-
lem.  The true cause is the fact that during inflation,
"Everyone becomes anxious to keep his cash hold-
ing, on which he continually suffers losses, as low as
possible" (Mises, 1978).  This preference of goods
to cash will allow prices to rise faster than the actual
inflation.  In reality, there is no shortage of money,
people are simply acting based on high inflation ex-
pectations.  Mises took an extremely pessimistic view
of countries using inflationary policy, predicting that,
"Once the people generally realize that the inflation
will be continued on and on
and that the value of the mon-
etary unit will decline more and
more, then the fate of the
money is sealed" (Mises,
1978).
Another, more complicated
way for inflation to begin ex-
ists; it occurs when the nomi-
nal interest rate falling below its
natural level.  The natural level
is defined as the rate that reflects the true scarcity of
capital in an economy.  This inflation occurs through
government mandated lowering of interest rates via
central banks, and the extension of bank credit
through fractional reserve lending.  Both are com-
monly prescribed methods for jump-starting an
economy.  While Austrians agree that low interest rates
are a recipe for a short economic expansion, again
they predict horrible long-term implications.  Ludwig
von Mises spent much of his career examining the
business cycle, and Friedrich von Hayek later contin-
ued and expanded this work.
Throughout his career, Mises attempted to
show that the extension of bank credit through frac-
tional reserve lending is very similar to the printing of
more money.  Only the way money enters circulation
is different.  "…by lowering the interest rate they
charge, banks can intensify the demand for credit.
Then, by satisfying this demand, they can increase the
quantity of fiduciary media in circulation" (Mises,
1978).  Such behavior by banks will lead to a cycle
beginning with economic growth, and ending with
economic depression or recession.  The growth phase
begins simply because credit is easily attainable for
entrepreneurs. "Since loan money is now cheaper to
acquire than circumstances warrant, entrepreneurial
ambitions expand" (Mises, 1978).  While mainstream
economists look at the ensuing growth as genuine
economic development, Austrians tend to be far more
skeptical.  Mises believed that "Every single fluctua-
tion in general business conditions- the upswing of
the peak of the wave and the decline into the trough
which follows- is prompted by the attempt of the banks
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of issue to reduce the loan rate and thus expand the
volume of circulation credit through an increase in the
supply of fiduciary media" (Mises, 1978).
Although a temporary boom can be created
through an artificially low interest rate, such growth
cannot be maintained.  Causing the growth is the false
signal that additional projects have become profit-
able at the new, lower interest rate.  The signal is false
in the sense that it was created "not through the accu-
mulation of capital, but through banking policy" (Mises,
1978).  The cycle begins as entrepreneurs through-
out the affected area enter new business ventures,
because more ventures are profitable at a lower in-
terest rate.
Businesses judge potential projects based on
the present value of future profits using the following
equation:
Present Value = S {Expected future profit/(1 + inter-
est rate)n
Extending bank credit through fractional reserve lend-
ing shrinks the denominator in this equation making
more projects profitable.  These projects represent
malinvestment and they eventually place upward pres-
sure on factor prices.  Causing this is the fact that the
newly lowered interest rate does not reflect the true
scarcity of capital.  The interest rate falsely signals to
entrepreneurs that the economy can support their
growth when in reality, the supply of capital and labor
has not increased.  All that happens is more firms be-
gin competing for the same stock of resources.  Soon
the labor market tightens, and materials become more
expensive.  Many projects that once seemed profit-
able now become unprofitable and fail.  Thus the bust
portion of the cycle occurs because the price inflation
is initially hidden (Mises, 1978).
Hayek's cycle theory expanded on how price
inflation reveals itself well after the expansionary policy
induces a cycle, and on the inner workings of the busi-
ness cycle.  He explained that lower interest rates
lead producers to invest in more roundabout meth-
ods of production.  Because credit can be obtained
cheaply, producers use more capital intensive meth-
ods that will lead to higher profits after the initial capi-
tal spending.  Hayek referred to this as a "lengthening
of the production process" (Hayek, 1967).  During
this period, investment in producer goods increases
as money shifts away from consumer goods.  In terms
of the business cycle, this is the boom portion.  All of
the new projects compete for a stock of capital and
labor that has not risen.  Thus, the boom ends as fac-
tor markets tighten and prices rise.  Capital projects
in progress are choked off by unforeseen expenses.
Then investment shifts back to consumer goods,
shortening the production process and sending the
economy into the bust portion of the business cycle.
The cycle runs its course as bankruptcies and
project abandonment clear up the situation.  Further
aggravation of the economy ensues as a negative im-
pression of credit causes banks to shy away from
providing credit, even for truly feasible projects.  This
can result in the interest rate climbing above the natu-
ral rate (Mises, 1978).  Examining the inner workings
of the business cycle is made extremely difficult by
the fact that bank credit is extended numerous times
during a cycle.  While this policy can extend the boom
portion of the cycle, it cannot indefinitely postpone
the bust.  An economic downturn will come once in-
dividuals realize that interests rates are artificially
lower, and that costs will eventually rise.  This could
happen at any time, so predicting a timeline for a busi-
ness cycle is impossible (Mises, 1978).
While it makes no predictions regarding time,
Austrian theory does offer many suggestions for how
to treat and end business cycles.  At the core of Aus-
trian treatment of business cycles is the belief that,
"The only way to do away with, or even to alleviate,
the periodic return of the trade cycle… is to reject
the fallacy that prosperity can be produced by using
bank procedures to make credit cheap" (Mises,
1978).  Once the cycle begins, nothing should be done
to alleviate the discomforts of the bust.  The market
must clear away the malinvestments caused by im-
proper market signals before the recession can end.
Attempts to control prices and soften the market's
fall will aggravate the situation by sending more im-
proper market signals.
One effect of bank credit remains for the most
part overlooked by Austrian economists.  Generally,
they fail to concede that bank credit can bring about
genuine growth.  Actually, not all of the expansionary
phase of the business cycle involves malinvestment.
Some businesses will use their credit in ways that ex
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pand the factors of production.  This economic ex-
pansion will keep the labor and capital markets from
tightening, thus allowing the boom phase to continue.
However, such success stories of bank credit
cannot forever halt the business cycle if the interest
rate continues to be held below its natural rate.  The
only way expansion could occur uninterrupted would
be if the increased productivity lowered the natural
rate to the same level as the nominal interest rate.
Further extension of bank credit would again push
the interest rate below its natural level and lead to an
economic downturn unless productivity was again
greatly increased.  Also, increased productivity does
not eliminate malinvestment, it merely allows the ma-
linvestment to continue.  This is because the bank credit
is available to any industry, not just the ones that in-
crease economic productivity.
Any increase in productivity that keeps the
economy in the boom phase is accidental.  If anyone
knew which industries were ready to grow substan-
tially and efficiently use credit, he or she would invest
more in those industries.  Governments directing or
mandating investment into certain industries would
more effectively create growth if the correct indus-
tries were known.  This would be necessary only when
the market was wrong about the growth potential of
an industry, and an inadequate amount of investment
was being delivered.  Austrian theory would adamantly
oppose government investment based on the conten-
tion of limited knowledge and the inability of any cen-
tral planner to grasp the vast complexities of the mar-
ket. Instead, the solution is to eliminate distorted sig-
nals and let the price system direct investment into the
correct areas.
IV.  MERITS OF THE GOLD STANDARD
If seignorage and the extension of bank credit
through fractional reserve lending are the causes of
the business cycle, other alternatives must be consid-
ered.  The monetary policy advocated by most Aus-
trians consists of eliminating bank credit through a
100% reserve gold standard.  Combining 100% re-
serves with a gold standard provides solid protection
against inflation.  Having a 100% reserve requirement
would stop banks from undercutting the natural inter-
est rate by extending bank credit.  Therefore a 100%
reserve gold standard will eliminate the expansion-
induced business cycle.
Making the monetary unit convertible to a set
amount of gold would end inflationary government
policies because increases in the quantity of money
must be met with equal increases in gold reserves.  In
essence, a 100% reserve gold standard rids the
economy of inflation.  Here one must note that the
price level will not be completely stable.  Achieving
complete stability is largely impossible, and Austrians
would argue that achieving it is unnecessary.  Under a
100% reserve gold standard, prices would most likely
fall gently over time.  This would occur because as
long as gold remains difficult to discover and mine,
increases in the quantity of money would occur at a
low rate relative to increases in productivity.  An im-
portant distinction needed here is that the tendency
towards falling prices need not result in the economic
problems associated with deflation.  Under a gold
standard "…a fall in prices would be the result of an
increase in production, not a decrease in spending"
(Reisman, 1990).  Because the problems associated
with deflation come about as result of a contraction in
the volume of spending in the economy, a 100% re-
serve gold standard actually protects the economy
from deflationary damages (Reisman, 1990).  A gold
standard protects because "nothing could happen that
would suddenly reduce the quantity of money, and
nothing could happen that would suddenly increase
the need or desire to hold money" (Reisman).  Falling
prices would serve to equilibrate the supply and de-
mand for money as the supply of goods in an economy
grew.
Two other benefits of a 100% reserve gold
standard come from the end of inflation.  First the
economy will experience permanently lower interest
rates.  This occurs because "the inflationary premium
is completely removed if a true gold standard exists"
(Paul, 1982).  Permanently lower interest rates allow
for speedier accumulation of capital and accelerated
economic growth.  The interest rate is lower because
less risk exists for lenders, not simply because the
federal reserve lowered rates.  If the interest rate still
reflects the true scarcity of capital, the boom/bust cycle
will be avoided, and the growth will be sustainable.
In addition to spurring economic growth, lower inter-
est rates will be extremely beneficial to governments
with high national debts (although as discussed later,
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additional debt financing is much more difficult under
a 100% reserve gold standard).  The second of this
group of benefits is that the economy will experience
a permanently higher savings rate.  With inflation out
of the picture, individuals would have no need to spend
in fear of depreciating purchasing power.  Over time
this greater savings rate, in an economy where the
price system and the interest rate accurately direct
investment, will lead to higher levels of economic
growth.
Another merit of the 100% reserve gold stan-
dard is that it strictly limits a government's ability to
run a deficit.  With a 100% reserve gold standard, a
government must balance its budget.  All government
programs must be funded through taxation.  This taxa-
tion will be either direct or indirect.  Direct taxation
simply means that today's tax dollars pay for today's
government spending.  Indirect taxation means that
tomorrow's tax dollars pay for today's government
spending.  The government could issue bonds to pay
for spending, but would have no means other than
taxation to eventually repay the debt.  Under the cur-
rent system, governments do not have to balance their
budgets.  Rather than increasing taxes to fund spend-
ing, governments can monetize the debt.  This en-
ables governments to increase spending because not
all citizens see that the negative effects of inflation are
caused by earlier fiscal irresponsibility.  A 100% re-
serve gold standard would limit government spending
to what citizens see as truly important because "tax-
ing the people the full amount for extravagant expen-
ditures would prove too unpopular and a liability in
the next election" (Paul, 1982).
If 100% reserves were required worldwide,
the benefits would be even larger.  In addition to sim-
ply aggregating the above-mentioned benefits, another
one would exist.  If all governments tied their cur-
rency to gold, no foreign exchange risk would exist.
This would decrease the cost of doing international
business.  The certainty provided would be welcomed
by economic participants worldwide, leading to even
greater economic growth.
V.  LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS OF A 100%
GOLD STANDARD
Successfully utilizing a 100% reserve gold
standard has major implications for government.  As
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan explained,
"…gold and economic freedom are inseparable, the
gold standard is an instrument of laissez-faire and each
implies and requires the other" (Greenspan, 1966).
The reasons for this are two-fold.  First, as already
mentioned, a 100% reserve gold standard limits gov-
ernment revenue generation to taxation, either direct
or indirect. The high tax rates needed to support in-
terventionist programs, both foreign and domestic, will
likely lose support when citizens are taxed to pay for
them.  Domestically, expansive welfare programs and
most public works would not survive under a 100%
reserve gold standard.
Abroad, one could speculate that foreign aid
would quickly lose support once taxpayers began di-
rectly footing the bill.  Also, the gold standard's impli-
cations for war are large.  With their enormous ex-
penditures being funded without seignorage or large
deficits, military actions would receive little public sup-
port.  This restriction on the government could prove
problematic in times when immediate and large-scale
military action is necessary.  Especially if a country on
a 100% reserve gold standard needed to defend it-
self from another country that funded its military
through expanding their money supply.  On the other
hand, if such action was absolutely necessary, the gov-
ernment could most likely raise the money through
taxation. Still, under those circumstances, countries
with a pure gold standard would probably need to
have a law allowing them to abandon 100% reserve
requirements in the case of a natural emergency.  Per-
haps the people could quickly vote on temporarily
abandoning the system.  This would help ensure that
governments undertake military action only when less
costly means of settling disputes fail to provide a so-
lution.  If adopted worldwide, a 100% reserve gold
standard would cut the number of military conflicts
everywhere by forcing governments to have the sup-
port of their people.  This support is not simply popu-
lar approval, but willingness on the part of citizens to
bear the extreme economic costs of fighting as well
as the social and emotional costs.  It is reasonable to
assume that whatever military conflicts still occurred
would be of far shorter duration, as governments would
receive pressure to settle using more diplomatic
means.
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Even if support for an interventionist govern-
ment policies, remained, the tax rates required for such
programs will likely stifle economic growth, by stunt-
ing savings rates and capital accumulation.  So if a
country prefers the interventionist route, a 100% re-
serve gold standard is not the proper monetary back-
bone.  Instead, the current fiat system is more appro-
priate.
VI.  TRANSITION TO A 100% RESERVE
GOLD STANDARD
To their credit, Austrian economists and oth-
ers have shown that a 100% reserve gold standard
can provide the framework for substantial, uninter-
rupted economic growth.  But to their detriment, these
economists have failed to complete their case by ef-
fectively showing how and at what consequence a
country could transition from a fiat system to a 100%
reserve gold standard.  Attempts have been made to
show how a transition could occur, but they are often
vague and theoretical.
The late Murray Rothbard, a leading Aus-
trian economist, gave general outlines of a transition
on several occasions.  His broad plan goes as follows
(Rothbard, 1994): First, fix the dollar to gold by rais-
ing the price of gold to equilibrate the Federal Reserve's
gold stock with its liabilities.  Using the Federal
Reserve's balance sheet as of April 6, 1994, Rothbard
arrives at a new value for the dollar of $1= 1/1554
ounce of gold.  Second, liquidate the federal reserve's
assets and get the gold stock into the hands of private
banks and individuals.  Third, transfer all note-issue
functions of the federal reserve and the treasury to
private banks.  Fourth, free the market for silver from
any fixed value of gold.  Fifth, eliminate the term dol-
lar, replacing it with its weight in gold.  This would
serve as evidence that the monetary unit is actually
gold represented by paper.  Sixth and finally, move to
private coinage of money.  Rothbard admits that he
does not have the perfect solution, but wanted his
work to convince readers that a 100% reserve gold
standard is the correct goal.  The greatest weakness
of his work is that he does not attempt to explain how
an economy would react to such a transition.
Ron Paul, United States Congressman from
Texas, outlined a plan in 1980 as part of the United
States Gold Commission.  His plan is very similar to
Rothbard's, but he does explain perceived transition
effects on various industries (Paul, 1982).  He ex-
plains that land values will drop in response to the
market no longer using land as a hedge against infla-
tion.  Also, industries will benefit from lower interest
rates, but businesses receiving special privileges and
subsidies will lose these benefits.  Banks would lose
their lender of last resort, government bailouts, and
would face increased competition leading to lower
margins.  Congressman Paul also fails to mention any
economy-wide problems with a transition.
Austrian economist and financial advisor
Mark Skousen wrote on the subject, and did attempt
to address the problems involved in the transition pro-
cess.  Unfortunately, he addressed them by saying
that he does not think "…a gold standard will be es-
tablished on its own.  No doubt such an event would
create a crisis.  But if a fiat dollar monetary crisis is
already happening, a return to gold may actually re-
establish economic stability" (Skousen, 1996).  Such
a statement shows the heart of the problem of propo-
nents of a 100% reserve gold standard.  Skousen
provides no further explanation as to the nature of
this crisis, its duration, or its solution.
George Reisman is the lone Austrian who truly
attempts to explain the transition process.  Like the
others, he offers a detailed explanation of the conse-
quences of fiat money and the merits of a 100% re-
serve gold standard.  Following that, he also suggests
that the dollar be revalued to the existing gold stock.
He explains that making money redeemable for gold
will sharply increase the demand for holding money
and thus cut the velocity substantially (Reisman, 1990).
Falling velocity will deflate the money supply, and this
contraction in spending, will devastate the economy.
Reisman claims that this economic downturn can be
avoided by "making the gold stock equal to enough
dollars to leave spending in terms of dollars unchanged
at the lower velocity" (Reisman, 1990).  The other
problem Reisman sees with transitioning to a 100%
gold standard is dealing with the debt burden.  By this
he means the amount of debt that debtors will not be
able to repay when fractional reserve banking halts.
The resulting mass of bankruptcies would overload
the court system, paralyzing the economy as individuals
try to sort out who owned what (Reisman 1990).  By
devaluing the dollar even further, one last burst of in-
David Rasho
The Park Place Economist / vol. IX 27
flation could allow the repayment of debts, and ready
the economy for a 100% reserve gold standard.
However, this solution would mean disaster for credi-
tors, minimizing the likelihood that such an event would
occur.  Reisman should be complimented for actually
attempting to answer the economic issues at hand.
However, his solution seems oversimplified, and the
issue deserves far more discussion.
The key to understanding the transition prob-
lem comes from its impact on the banking system.
Under a pure gold standard, citizens would not re-
ceive interest on their bank and checking deposits.
Customers of banks would pay a fee to have their
money stored for them.  Paying this fee would be
acceptable to customers because they know that their
cash holdings would appreciate slightly over time.
Since customers are no worse off holding their money
in banks under a pure gold standard, no reason exists
to believe that customers would remove their money
from banks.  Because banks can no longer lend out
large portions of this money, the velocity of money
will drop sharply.  Although he does not explicitly
mention it, this is most likely the logic behind Reisman's
argument.  After becoming accustomed to the new
system, individuals may decide that they do not need
all of their savings account immediately redeemable.
In that case, they will look to invest their money in
search of higher returns, increasing the velocity of
money.  They could accomplish this by allowing their
money to be lent out to others.
The lending function of banks would be sepa-
rated under a pure gold standard.  Spun-off lending
divisions would attract money in the same fashion as
other businesses.  Investors would be offered poten-
tial returns in exchange for accepting the risk of losing
their investment.  Unlike our current deposit system,
no insurance would exist to protect these investments
from losses.  This will force lending businesses to make
their business more appealing to their investors.  Lend-
ers can accomplish this through either offering higher
returns, or lessening their investor's risk by making
loans more carefully.  Most likely, lenders will use
some combination of the two.
Attempting to circumvent the inevitable eco-
nomic downturn is far from easy, even after under-
standing its cause.  The best way to soften the eco-
nomic blow is to give the market time to adjust.  An-
nouncing that a 100% reserve gold standard will be
in place at a specific date in the future will allow the
market to put itself in the best possible position when
the transition finally takes place.  Such an announce-
ment will result in an immediate but gradual revalua-
tion of gold, as the time for convertibility approaches.
Only the market can make the process gradual.  If
the government tried gradually devaluing gold and al-
lowing convertibility at the same time, the results would
be disastrous.  In that case, people would redeem all
their dollars for gold because they know their dollars
will depreciate. Another point that must be empha-
sized is that for such a program to work, the change
to a 100% reserve gold standard must be definite.
Economic participants must be certain that the pro-
gram will be brought to fruition.  Otherwise the added
uncertainty would slow the transition process and
confuse those industries needing to make adjustments.
By simply making the transition known well
in advance, the government allows banks and their
customers to adjust accordingly.  Banks would be
able to plan the spin-off of their lending business,
which could begin operating efficiently once the new
system is implemented.  Velocity would fall upon the
announcement of the transition, but the fall would be
less severe.  In addition, velocity would begin rising
more quickly if the banking industry is prepared when
convertibility begins.
VII.   CONCLUSION
A 100% reserve gold standard could pro-
vide a framework for uninterrupted economic growth.
Such a standard could rid economies of inflation, busi-
ness cycles and banking crises.  Proponents of a 100%
reserve gold standard have sufficiently explored busi-
ness cycle theory to show the problems of fractional
reserve banking.  They have also adequately shown
how a 100% reserve gold standard could work, and
they have some empirical support from the 19th cen-
tury.  However, these economists have done very little
to show how to transition from a fiat monetary sys-
tem to a 100% reserve gold standard.  So long as this
research void exists, there is no reason to expect the
call for a 100% reserve gold standard to grow much
louder.  Unless a painless transfer could be reason-
ably assured, governments are very unlikely to change
their monetary system.
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